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EVERY PASSING DAY ...
Emanuel Margolist
In the course of its infamous opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford,I the
U.S. Supreme Court pointed to Connecticut as one of several anti2
slave trade states that accepted the inequality of the "African race."
The case cited for this bizarre proposition was Crandallv. State.3
Prudence Crandall was a Caucasian educator who founded a girls
school in the early 1830s. 4 When she admitted a black girl to her
school, a number of irate white parents withdrew their children, and
she incurred the violent opposition of her neighbors. 5 In 1831, she
founded another school for young ladies and "little misses of color" in
Canterbury, Connecticut, some ten miles west of the Massachusetts
6
border.
Her neighbors were outraged, resorting to insults, abuse, and
boycotts without success. The school even continued to function in
the face of hostile public meetings denouncing its existence. Petitions
were circulated, and shortly thereafter, in 1833, the Connecticut legislature passed a "Black Law" making it a crime for anyone to establish a
school or "literary institution" for the education of nonresident blacks
or to teach in such a school without obtaining "the consent in writing..., of the civil authority, and also of the select-men of the town" in
7
which such instruction was to take place.
Prudence Crandall was arrested, tried, and convicted before
Chief Justice Daggett8 sitting as the trial judge. The charge was
"harbouring and boarding coloured persons not belonging to this
t Constitutional Law and Civil Rights Attorney; Legal Advisor to Connecticut Civil
Liberties Union; Adjunct Professor, Quinnipiac University Law School; Frequent Contributor to Law Journals; Of Counsel to Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin & Kuriansky in Stamford,
Connecticut.
1 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
2
Id. at 415, If "[blacks] were not even [in Connecticut] raised to the rank of citizens, but were still held and treated as property," the Court was satisfied that blacks were
hardly likely to be "elevated to a higher rank anywhere else." Id.
3 10 Conn. 339 (1834), available at 1834 WL 102.
4

EDMUND FULLER, PRUDENCE CRANDALL: AN INCIDENT OF RACISM IN NINETEENTH-CEN-

12-13 (1971).
Id.
Id,
See Crandall, 10 Conn. at 340 n.(a), 366.

TURY CONNECTICUT

5
6
7

8 Daggett, together with Samuel Hitchcock, founded the Yale Law School in 1826.
See HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL 34-35 (Anthony T. Kronman ed., 2004).
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state."9 Chief Justice Daggett, in his jury instructions, embarked from
the following proposition: "The African race are [sic] essentially a degraded caste, of inferior rank and condition in society. Marriages...
between them and whites . . . are revolting, and regarded as an offence against public decorum." 10
It was a short step from Daggett's racist assumption to his determination that it was the jury's duty to convict Ms. Crandall, who, "with
force and arms, willfully and knowingly did harbour and board certain
coloured persons" contrary to the Connecticut "black law."11 Thejury
instructions included the following:
To my mind, it would be a perversion of terms, and the well-known
rule of construction, to say, that slaves, free blacks, or Indians, were
citizens, within the meaning of that term, as used in the constitution. God forbid that I should add to the degradation of this race of
12
men; but I am bound, by my duty, to say, they are not citizens.
Although this egregious rationale for sustaining a racially exclusionary law prohibiting out-of-state blacks from attending a school in
Connecticut remains "on the books," it is important to note that Crandall's conviction was ultimately reversed on appeal, albeit on a technicality.13 Prudence Crandall's victory in court was nevertheless Pyrrhic.
Anti-abolitionist mobs attacked and partially destroyed her house, and
14
she spent the rest of her life in Illinois and Kansas.
Crandall offers the perfect prologue to Brown v. Board of Education and its Connecticut analogue, Sheff v. O'Neill.16 The State of
Connecticut, like many states in the union, continued to grapple with
the "badges and incidents of slavery"' 7 long after its formal abolition
in the state.
School segregation is one such "badge and incident." Brown was
decided 120 years after Crandall, and the Sheff litigation was planned
some thirty years after Brown. This Article proposes to examine Brown
and Sheff as two decisions, forty-two years apart, closely linked, with
similar disappointing results for minority schoolchildren. Nevertheless, both offered some measure of hope for Connecticut's public
school children.
15

9
10

11

Crandall,10 Conn. at 341.

Id. at 346.
Id. at 340.

Ld.
at 347.
Id. at 369-71. The information failed to state that Ms. Crandall's school was "not
licensed," which the Court held to be a "fatal defect." Id. at 369.
14
FULLER, supra note 4, at 92-95.
15
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
17
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
12

13
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"Two Connecticuts:" Separate and Unequal

By the mid-1980s, it was more apparent, with each passing year,
that Connecticut's public school system was becoming increasingly
segregated by race.' 8 The Commissioner of Education warned of ominous emerging trends in public school demographics. Unfortunately,
Connecticut's century-old system of public school districts had begun
to reflect and reinforce the broader racial divisions within society.1 9
In 1988, a Committee on Racial Equality appointed by the Connecticut Commissioner of Education published a report containing
recommendations "that seek to avoid a portrayal of the state as two
Connecticuts-the affluent and the poor, participants and nonparticipants, white and minority." 20 Many school districts resisted Connecticut's 1969 "Racial Imbalance Law,"' 21 leading the Connecticut
Department of Education to cite a number of districts for noncompliance. 22 The Department's own statistics demonstrated that the state's
efforts to reduce racial imbalance and to provide minority students
23
with an integrated learning environment were failing.
If these trends continued, the report concluded, the cities of
Hartford, New Haven, and Bridgeport would "become effectively allminority school districts." 24 These circumstances were already apparent to minority students themselves, who decided to seek judicial relief not long after the report was submitted. On April 26, 1989, Milo
Sheff, a fourth-grader in a Hartford public school, along with seven18 Interestingly, the City of Hartford passed an ordinance in 1868 that assigned African-American students to a specially designated public school. See Raymond B. Marcin,
Nineteenth Century Dejure Segreation in Connecticut, 45 CONN. B.J. 394, 397-98 (1971). The
Connecticut legislature (hereafter the "General Assembly") passed a statute providing for
open enrollment in all of the state public schools without regard to race. CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 10-15c (2003).
19 Under the provisions of what is now Connecticut General Statutes § 10-240, the
boundaries for the Hartford public school district became coterminous with the boundaries of the City of Hartford. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-240 (2003).
20

CoMMITT-FE ON RACIAL EQuITy, A REPORT ON RACIAL/ETHNIC EQUITY AND DESEGRE-

[hereinafter COMMITTEE ON RACIAL
(prepared for presentation to the Connecticut State Board of Education).
21 Connecticut General Statutes §§ 10-226a through 10-226e, enacted in 1969, were
intended to address problems of ethnic imbalance in urban public schools in Hartford,
Bridgeport, and New Haven, whose minority enrollments were then exceeding seventy percent. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 10-226a-e (2003).
22 COMMITTEE ON RACLcL EQuITY REPORT, supra note 20, at 7-8. Regulations to implement the statute were not promulgated until 1980-eleven years subsequent to its passage.
Id. at 7.
23 Id at 8; id. at fig.6 (showing a 90.4% proportion of minorities enrolled in the Hartford school district, while neighboring school districts had minority student populations of
less than 6%).
24 Id. at 5 (showing that in October 1986, New Haven's and Bridgeport's percentages
of minority students had risen to 81.2 and 83.4, respectively).
CATION IN CONNECTICUT'S PUBLIC SCHoOLS 4 (1988)
EQurrY REPORT]
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teen other plaintiffs, 25 filed suit against the governor, other state officials, and the Connecticut Board of Education.
B.

Cloning Brown: Incubation In State Forum

In the fall of 1988, a group gathered at Mory's-a restaurant in
New Haven immortalized in song by the 'Yale Whiffenpoofs"-to discuss a litigation strategy for attacking school segregation. Lawyers
from the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union (of which I had recently
been elected chair) ,26 the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People, the Yale Law School, and the Connecticut Latino
community were present.
The state's report2 7 on the growing severity of racial segregation
had been published just the previous January. Those gathered at
Mory's were of the opinion that the governor and the state legislature
would not address the problem unless forced to do so. The only recourse was to the courts and the constitution, but the question remained: to which court and which constitution?
For those addressing the problem of school segregation in 1988,
Brown offered inspiration but scant practical utility for Connecticut's
problems. Looming as a major legal barrier was the 1973 U.S. Supreme Court decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez, which held that public education was not a fundamental right
under the U.S. Constitution.2 8 In contrast, the Connecticut Constitution and case law established such a right as clearly fundamental. The
Connecticut Supreme Court decidedly stated: "We conclude that without doubt. . . in Connecticut, elementary and secondary education is
a fundamental right, [and] that pupils in the public schools are enti25

In addition to Milo Shell, the other plaintiffs were:
Wildalize Bermudez, a Latino child residing in Hartford; Pedro Bermudez,
a Latino child residing in Hartford; Eva Bermudez, a Latino child residing

in Hartford; Oskar M. Melendez, a Latino child residing in Glastonbury;
Waleska Melendez, a Latino child residing in Glastonbury; Martin Hamilton, an African-American child residing in Hartford; Janelle Hughley, an
African-American child residing in Hartford; Neiima Best, an African-American child residing in Hartford; Lisa Laboy, a Latino child residing in Hartford; David William Harrington, a white child residing in Hartford; Michael
Joseph Harrington, a white child residing in Hartford; Rachel Leach, a
white child residing in West Hartford; Joseph Leach, a white child residing
in West Hartford; Erica Connolly, a white child residing in Hartford; Tasha
Connolly, a white child residing in Hartford; Michael Perez, a Latino child
residing in Hartford; and Dawn Perez, a Latino child residing in Hartford.
Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1271 n.3 (Conn. 1996).
26 1 participated as the newly elected Chair of the C.C.L.U. and a practicing civil
rights lawyer.
27
COMMI-rFEE ON RACIAL EQUITY REPORT, supra note 20.
28
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-36 (1973). This decision rejected a constitutional challenge to the manner in which Texas financed its public
schools. See id.
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tled to the equal enjoyment of that right .... ,,29 The resulting consensus among the "Mory's lawyers" was that the state forum offered
more hospitable terrain than the federal courts.
The factual basis for a complaint seeking relief from racial segregation in Connecticut's schools was overwhelming and irrefutable. Indeed, the State Board of Education-a named defendant-provided
much of the data and impetus for the lawsuit. The worst pattern of
public school segregation, dramatized by the predominantly white
public schools in the surrounding districts, was found in the Hartford
school district.3 ° Segregation in Bridgeport and New Haven was almost as stark, 31 while the town of Bloomfield (contiguous to and
north of Hartford) exhibited patterns of racial segregation similar to
32
those of its larger neighbor.
The pattern of segregation was not the result of purposeful or
intentional discrimination on the part of the state. Connecticut had
never engaged in the kind of misconduct attributed to the boards of
education in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware in Brown
thirty-five years earlier. The plaintiffs did not allege purposeful discrimination because it could not be proved. Absent such de jure segregation, our plaintiffs instead needed to allege and prove that (1)
their right to a public school education was fundamental under Connecticut law; (2) racially segregated school districts were inherently
unequal and provided unequal educational opportunities for minority
students; and (3) the defendants failed to meet their state constitutional obligations to correct these inequities.
The complaint stated that school children throughout Connecticut, "including the City of Hartford and its adjacent suburban com'3
It
munities, are largely segregated by race and ethnic origin.
alleged that the Hartford public schools, because they had such a high
proportion of students who were "at risk" of lower educational
achievement, "operate at a severe educational disadvantage [which
has rendered them] unable to provide educational opportunities that
"

29

Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1977); see also Horton v. Meskill, 486

A.2d 1099, 1105 (Conn. 1985) (noting that Connecticut is required to afford all students a
"substantially equal educational opportunity"). The Horton cases challenged the Connecticut system that financed public education in a grossly disparate manner.
30
Of the more than 25,000 school children enrolled in the Hartford district at the
time suit was brought on April 26, 1989, the minority enrollment was over 90%, whereas in
surrounding districts it was typically in single digits. Pls.' Compl. at 9, Sheffv. O'Neill, 238
Conn. 1 (1996) (No. 15255) [hereinafter Complaint].

31

As of the 1986-1987 academic year, the percentage of minority student enrollment

in Bridgeport and New Haven was 83.4 and 81.2, respectively, and rising. COMmriI.E ON
RACIAL Evuiiy REPhORr, supra note 20, at 1.
32
With a total school population of 2,555 in Bloomfield, the minority student per-

centage was 69.9%. See Complaint, supra note 30, at 9. Bloomfield was too small a target,
albeit an ancillary one.
'3

Complaint, supra note 30, at 8.
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are substantially equal to those received by schoolchildren in the suburban districts." 34
The plaintiffs also claimed that "[m]easured by the State's own
educational standards, . . .a majority of Hartford schoolchildren are
'' 5
not currently receiving even a 'minimally adequate education.' 1
They further contended that
[fl or well over two decades, the State of Connecticut, through [the
defendants] and their predecessors, have been aware of: (i) the separate and unequal pattern of public school districts in the State of
Connecticut and the greater Hartford metropolitan region; (ii) the
strong governmental forces that have created and maintained racially and economically isolated residential communities in the
Hartford region; and (iii) the consequent need for substantial edudistrict lines, to end this
cational changes, within and across3 school
6
pattern of isolation and inequality.
The "keystone in the arch" of the Sheff complaint echoed the reasoning of Brown v. Board of Education,but largely incorporated various
provisions of the Connecticut Constitution as its basis."'37 The plaintiffs designed their litigation strategy to both avoid the pitfalls of an
evidentiary burden of proof that they could not meet-the de jure
segregation standard-and circumvent Rodriguez's apparently insurmountable barrier to federal equal protection claims. 38
39
The trial lasted six weeks and concluded in February 1993.
Closing arguments did not take place until November 1994, and the
trial court did not file a decision until April 12, 1995-almost six full
40
years from the filing of the complaint.
The trial court ruled for the defendants. Its central reasoning
was that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that "state action is a direct
and sufficient cause of the conditions" that were the subject matter of
their complaint, "and that accordingly the constitutional claims asserted by the plaintiffs need not be addressed."41 Judge Hammer agreed
34

Id. at 11-12.

M5

Id. at 14.

Id. at 16.
See Constitutional textual provisions quoted infra text accompanying notes 55-57.
38 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-36 (1973).
39 Memorandum of Decision, Sheff v. O'Neill, No. CV89-03609775, at 22 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Apr. 12, 1995) [hereinafter Decision], vacated by 678 A.2d 1267 (1996).
40 Id. In this context the caveat of the Connecticut Supreme Court reversing the trial
court is well worth noting: "Every passing day denies these children their constitutional right
to a substantially equal educational opportunity. Every passing day shortchanges these children in their ability to learn to contribute to their own well-being and to that of this state
and nation." Sheff 678 A.2d at 1290 (emphasis added).
41
See Decision, supra note 39, at 72 (emphasis added).
36
37
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with the state's primary defense, 42 namely that no evidence of formal
(de jure) state action existed, nor was there any proof of purposeful
discriminatory conduct by state actors. 43 The very constitutional
claims that the trial court chose not to address were essential as a ratio
deciderendi given the undisputed facts before it. In fact, Judge Hammer barely mentioned Brown v. Board of Education,44 and his opinion,
with references to federal case law, contains not a single reference to
the crucial Connecticut constitutional provisions that formed the
linchpin of the plaintiffs' case. 45 Judge Hammer failed to understand
that the core of the plaintiffs' claim in Sheffwas based on the Connecticut state constitution premise: that public education constituted a
fundamental right.
This misperception was also the fatal flaw in the U.S. Supreme
Court's reasoning in Rodriguez. 46 In the course of rejecting a constitu47
tional challenge to the Texas system for financing public schools,
the Court held that education was not a fundamental constitutional
right.48 Writing for the majority, Justice Lewis Powell declared:
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it
to be found by weighing whether education is as important as the
right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is
a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
49
Constitution.

42
The other defenses raised were (1) sovereign immunity, (2) stare decisis, (3) separation of powers, (4) lack of a justiciable controversy, (5) the failure to join necessary
parties, including the city of Hartford, and (6) the unavailability of court-ordered remedies, a variant of separation of powers. See Sheff 678 A.2d at 1272. The defenses of sovereign immunity, stare decisis, and failure to join necessary parties were never pursued.
43
See Decision, supra note 39, at 71-72.
44
See id. at 44-45, 67. Neither Brown Inor Brown !!were cited for their authority but
merely tangentially. Id. The federal authorities cited, including page after page of opinion
and dicta by Justice William 0. Douglas, were similarly inapposite to plaintiffs' state law
claims. Id. at 64-71.
45
46

Id.

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-36 (1973).
Local property taxes funded public schools in such a manner that one school district expended $356 per pupil, whereas a wealthier district expended $594. Id. at 12-13.
48
Id. at 29-36.
49
Id. at 33-34.
47
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The Court concluded that no such federal constitutional right existed. 50 Blinded by Rodriguez and its progeny,5 1 Judge Hammer's opinion traveled through a maze of federal and state court decisions,
ignoring the core premise of plaintiffs' case that, under the Connecticut Constitution and Connecticut Supreme Court precedent, education is a fundamental right in Connecticut.
C.

The Road from Brown to Sheff

The Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Sheffv. O'Neill can
be traced directly back to Brown v. Board of Education. It is more than
arguable that, had Brown not been decided in 1954, the milestone of
Sheff never would have occurred. The resulting constitutional hurdle
would have rendered de facto school segregation less vulnerable to
attack.
Just as the U.S. Supreme Court derived fundamental rights from
a number of constitutional provisions, 52 the Connecticut Supreme
Court held that Connecticut school children possess a fundamental
right to substantially equal educational opportunities.5 3 Any infringement of that right by the state or its agents is subject to strict scrutiny
54
by the courts.
In the very first paragraph of its opinion, which reverses Judge
Hammer's opinion and directs judgment for the plaintiffs, the Court
cites three provisions of the Connecticut Constitution that were at the
epicenter of the cause of action and, as shown, the trial court simply
did not address:
[article first, §1] All men when they form a social compact, are
equal in rights; and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive
public emoluments or privileges from the community. 55
50
Id. at 35. Recall that among the fundamental rights implicitly guaranteed by the
U.S. Constitution are the right to privacy, Roe v.Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); the fight
to travel, Shapiro v.Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969); the right to marry (and
divorce), Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971); the right to parental custody
and care of children, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972); and the right to rear
one's children, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66-67 (2000).
51
See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 465 (1988) (reiterating that education is not a fundamental right ina case challenging the North Dakota fee system for use
of school buses).
52
The Court has derived fundamental rights from constitutional provisions through
the "penumbra" concept, which first appeared in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1965). See also cases cited supra note 50.
Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1280-81 (Conn. 1996).
53
54 Within this constitutional frame of reference, the "state action" requirement-the
absence of which was fatal to the plaintiffs' case at the trial level-is totally transformed.
Purposefld or dejure discriminatory intent need not be shown because "fundamentality"
imports a corresponding affirmative state obligation to implement and maintain plaintiffs'
"fundamental fight to a substantially equal educational opportunity." Id. at 1280.
55 CONN. CONST., art. first, § 1 (the equal protection clause).
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[article first, § 20] No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in
the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or physi56
cal or mental disability.
[article eighth, §1] There shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state. The general assembly shall
57
implement this principle by appropriate legislation.
The legislature amended the Connecticut Constitution in 1965 by
adding the second and third sections quoted above. 58 The Sheff Court
was persuaded that
a fair reading of the text and the history of these amendments demonstrates a deep and abiding constitutional commitment to a public
school system that, in fact and in law, provides Connecticut schoolchildren with a substantially equal educational opportunity. A significant component of that substantially equal educational
opportunity is access to a public school education that is not substantially impaired by racial and ethnic isolation. 50
The Connecticut Supreme Court's Chief Justice, Ellen Peters, authored the Sheff majority opinion. Justice Peters embarked from the
proposition that "constitutional imperatives" contained in the equal
protection clause, the antidiscrimination clause, and the free public
education clause of the Connecticut Constitution entitled the plaintiffs to relief.60 In stark contrast to the trial court's conclusion, the
very first paragraph of the Sheff opinion addresses the state constitu61
tional issues.
The antidiscrimination and free public education clauses not
only influenced Justice Peters's analysis, but were also clearly controlling on the key issues of "protection from [de facto] segregation" and
the affirmative duty of the legislature "to provide 'access to a public
school education that is not substantially impaired by racial and ethnic isolation."' 62 The court read the two clauses conjointly,63 although the clauses owed their insertion into the new constitutional
text in 1965 to different raisons d'etre.
56 Id. § 20 (the antidiscrimination clause).
57 Id. art. eighth, § 1 (the free public education clause).
58 The Connecticut equal protection clause (Article first, §1) preexisted the 1965
amended Constitution and appeared in identical language in the constitutions of 1955 and
1818.
59 Sheff 678 A.2d at 1280.
60
Id. at 1270-71.
61
Id.
62 See id.at 1280.
63 See id. at 1270-71.
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The free public education clause was aimed at plugging a major
constitutional gap: As of 1965, Connecticut was the only state in the
country that failed to provide in its Constitution any express right to
free public education. 6 4 More significantly, the antidiscrimination
clause owed its language, at least in part, to the decision in Brown v.
65
Board of Education.
The Brown case, a mere afterthought in the judgment of the trial
66
became a centerpiece in the Sheff opinion. 67 The Connecticourt,
cut Supreme Court observed, just as the U.S. Supreme Court had in
its 1954 milestone desegregation decision, that "education is perhaps
the most important function of state and local governments."6 8 The
centrality of public education as a government responsibility, indeed
as a constitutional mandate, similarly drove the decision in Sheff.
The dissenting justices bitterly characterized the Sheff decision as
"a result that is unprecedented in American jurisprudence. ' 69 Nevertheless, there was little disagreement between the parties in Sheff as to
why this opportunity did not exist in the factual context of the pending litigation. 70 Equal educational opportunity in the Hartford school
district was a chimera. The cause of segregation was obvious to all
71
The
sides: the state's statutorily-created school districting scheme.
majority concluded that Connecticut's districting system was unconstitutional as codified in its statutes and as enforced with regard to the
plaintiffs. 72 The trial court's own finding on this issue was the major
premise that led the Sheff Court to its conclusion of
unconstitutionality:
See id. at 1283-84.
In fact, the Sheff opinion credits Brown as having influenced the constitutional convention's adoption of both article first, § 20, and article eighth § 1: "When the convention
delegates debated the desirability of both amendments to our state constitution, they recognized and endorsed the landmark decision in Brown v.Board of Education, declaring the
unconstitutionality of 'separate but equal' public school education." Sheff 678 A.2d at
1283 (citations omitted).
66
See Sheffv. O'Neill, No. CV89-0360977S, 1995 WL 230992, at *17-18, 26-28 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Apr. 12, 1995).
See Sheff 678 A.2d at 1289-90.
67
68
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
69
Sheff 678 A.2d at 1295 (Borden, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1287-89.
70
71
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-240 (2003)
64
65

Control of schools. Each town shall through its board of education maintain the control of all public schools within its limits and for this purpose shall
be a school districtand shall have all the powers and duties of school districts,
except so far as such powers and duties are inconsistent with the provisions
of this chapter.
(emphasis added)); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-184 (2002) (requiring parents, subject to limited exceptions, to cause their child "to attend a public school .. , in the district in which
such child resides.").
72
Sheff 678 A.2d at 1289.
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"[tihe single most importantfactor that contribute[s] to the present concentration of racialand ethnic minorities in Hartford [is] the town-school dis-

trict system [codified at §10-240] which has existed since 1909, when
the legislature consolidated most of the school districts in the state
the dividing lines beso that thereafter town boundaries became
73
tween all school districts in the state."

The Sheff majority attributed independent constitutional significance to the inclusion of the term "segregation" in article first, § 20.74
This term is pivotal for defining the scope and content of the state's
duties in the face of de facto school segregation. These affirmative
obligations are "infoirned and amplified by the highly unusual provision . .. that prohibits segregation not only indirectly, by forbidding
75
discrimination, but directly, by the use of the term 'segregation.'
The special and affirmative emphasis on inclusion of the term "segregation" 76 per se, led the court directly to its conclusion that "in the
context of public education, in which the state has an affirmative obligation to monitor and to equalize educational opportunity, the state's
awareness of existing and increasing severe racial and ethnic isolation
imposes upon the state the responsibility to remedy 'segregation...
because of race [or] . . . ancestry."

77

The weakest link in the chain of the Sheff litigation that led to the
reassertion-perhaps limited resuscitation would be more accurateof the Brown ideal was the elusive concept of remedy. The Connecticut Supreme Court reluctantly78 felt obliged to defer to the legislature
on this crucial issue. Unfortunately, the plaintiffs' claims for relief
were not models of clarity. 79 The court held that the legislature was

Id (quotation marks in original).
Id. at 1283.
75 Id. at 1281-82. The New Jersey constitution is the only other state constitution
specifically prohibiting segregation in public schools. See N.J. CONST., art. I, para. 5; see also
73
74

Jenkins v. Morris Sch. Dist., 279 A.2d 619, 631-33 (N.J. 1971) (holding that the commissioner could prevent withdrawal of children from one district school to enroll in a different high school if the result would be to increase racial imbalance in the two schools).

Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1281-82. But cf id. at 1315 (Borden, J., dissenting) (reasoning
76
that the term "segregation" should apply only in cases of intentional de facto segregation).
77 Id. at 1282-83 (internal citations omitted).
See id. at 1290 ("We direct the legislature and the executive branch to put the
78
search for appropriate remedial measures at the top of their respective agendas."). Milo
Sheff was already in his senior year of high school. See Emmanuel Margolis, SheffAnniversary HighlightsProblems Still to Solve, CONN. L. TRIB., June 14, 2004, at 19. Recall the court's

clear warnings of "every passing day." See Sheff 678 A.2d at 1290.
79

In addition to the declaratory judgment they sought declaring the State of Con-

necticut to be in violation of the constitutional principles described above, the plaintiffs
asked for a preliminary and permanent injunction to provide them "and those similarly
situated" with "an integrated education . . . equal education opportunities... [and] minimally adequate education." Complaint, supra note 30, at 28.
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required by the state constitution "to take affirmative responsibility to
remedy segregation in our public schools."' 0
The fact that the court did not direct the legislature to proceed
"with all deliberate speed" was, with tongue-in-cheek and fingers
crossed, taken as a good omen for those old enough to remember the
giddy period of Brown and its hopeful aftermath. While using the
term "urgency," the Sheff opinion did not specify a time frame for reducing the racial and ethnic isolation of the Hartford
schoolchildren. 8 1
D.

Two Steps Forward and...

The urgent plight of the Hartford children initially met with a
positive legislative response. The "Land of Steady Habits"8' 2 seemed
poised to change. Unlike the explosion of'judicial activism triggered
by Brown, the Sheff decision prompted a more measured response
from the General Assembly. The statutory changes, while far from
tectonic, nonetheless did not lack long-term significance. The General Assembly, to which the court had deferred, could not ignore the
Sheff decision: "[T] he constitutional imperative of separation of powers persuades us to afford the legislature, with the assistance of the
executive branch, the opportunity, in the first instance, to fashion the
remedy that will most appropriately respond to the constitutional violations that we have identified."83
The state legislative body stood up and took notice with a fair
degree of deliberate speed. Perhaps the most dramatic and immediate was the elimination of the elected Hartford Board of Education in
1997 and its replacement with a State Board of Trustees to serve as the
governing body for the Hartford public schools. With this change
80 Sheff 678 A.2d at 1283. 1am inclined to speculate that this deference to the legislature was the price that the Chief Justice was obliged to pay in order to obtain or retain her
narrow majority. In this context, it is instructive to recall the brick-by-brick construction of
a majority and, ultimately, the unanimity of the justices in the Brown case. See RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v. EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY

678-99 (1976); see also

BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: How THE

95-100 (1996) (detailing ChiefJustice Warren's efforts to
obtain and maintain a unanimous opinion).
81
Sheff 678 A.2d at 1290 ("In staying our hand, we do not wish to be misunderstood
SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES

about the urgency of finding an appropriate remedy for the plight of Hartford's
schoolchildren.").
82
Nickname for the State of Connecticut, which is officially called "the Constitution
state" by reason of the fact that its first "constitution" dates back to "The Fundamental
Orders" of 1638-39. THE FIRST CONSTITUTION OF CONNECTICUT: "THE FUNDA.MENTAL ORDERS," 1638-39, reprinted in CONNECTICUT SECRETARY OF STATE, CONNECTICUT STATE REGISTER AND MANUAL 49-53 (1988); see also Connecticut: The Nicknames, at http://

www.netstate.com/states/intro/ct-intro.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (providing a brief
history and explanation of each of Connecticut's nicknames).
83
Sheff 678 A.2d at 1271.
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came new state resources and new performance standards.8 4 More
substantively, the legislature increased the state's appropriations for
interdistrict cooperative programs, interdistrict magnet schools, "lighthouse" schools, the "choice program," and minority staff
recruitment.8 5
In addition, the legislature enacted Public Act 98-25286 within two
years of the Sheffdecision. This new statute placed specific obligations
upon local school districts, inter alia, (1) to "document" pupils and
teachers of racial minorities;8 7 (2) to prepare plans to address racial
imbalance in their districts, as well as to make future projections as to
such imbalance; 88 (3) to include provisions for cooperation with other
school districts in order to assist in the correction of racial imbalance;89 and (4) to be subject to State Board of Education regulations
governing approval of local plans to correct racial imbalance, with
particular reference to "school districts with minority enrollments of
fifty percent or more."9 0
The Sheff Court's directive to the legislature appears to have
prompted the new law. The language of the statute unmistakably
adopts the plaintiffs' vocabulary, namely "programs and methods to
reduce racial, ethnic and economic isolation."9' On its face at least,
the law9 2 constituted a serious plan of attack upon the pattern of unconstitutional school segregation in Connecticut, reading as follows:
(a) A local or regional board of education for purposes of subdivision (3) of section 10-4a may offer such programs or use such
methods as: (1) Interdistrict magnet school programs; (2) charter
schools; (3) interdistrict after-school, Saturday and summer programs and sister-school projects; (4) intradistrict and interdistrict
public school choice programs; (5) interdistrict school building
projects; (6) interdistrict program collaboratives for students and
staff; (7) distance learning through the use of technology; and (8)
any other experience that increases awareness of the diversity of individuals and cultures.
(b) Each local and regional board of education shall report by
July 1, 2000, and biennially thereafter, to the regional educational
See Sheffv. O'Neill, 733 A.2d 925, 935 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999).
See id at 928-34.
86
1998 CONN. ACTs 98-252. Most of its provisions found their way into what is now
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 10-226a, h (2002).
87
Id. § 10-226.
88 Id. § 10-226(c).
89
d § 10-226c(b). Of interest is the use of the optional "may" in this particular statutory provision.
90
Id. § 10-226e.
84
85

91

Id. § 10-226h.

1997 CONN. AuTs 97-290 § 2; 1998 CoNN. AcTs 98-252
220 § 11 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-226h (2000)).
92

§ 14; 2000

CONN.

Ac's 00-
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service center for its area on the programs and activities undertaken
in its school district to reduce racial, ethnic and economic isolation,
including (1) information on the number and duration of such programs and activities and the number of students and staff involved,
and (2) evidence of the progress over time in the reduction of racial, ethnic and economic isolation.
(c) Each regional educational service center shall report by October 1, 2000, and biennially thereafter, to the Commissioner of Education on the programs and activities undertaken in its region to
reduce racial, ethnic and economic isolation.
(d) The Commissioner of Education shall report, byJanuary 1,
1999, and biennially thereafter, in accordance with section 10-4a, to
the Governor and the General Assembly on activities and programs
designed to reduce racial, ethnic and economic isolation. The report shall include statistics on any growth in such programs or expansion of such activities over time, an analysis of the success of
such programs and activities in reducing racial, ethnic and economic isolation, a recommendation for any statutory changes that
would assist in the expansion of such programs and activities and
the sufficiency of the annual grant pursuant to subsection (e) of
section 10-266aa and whether additional financial incentives would
93
improve the program established pursuant to section 10-266aa.
The plaintiffs returned to the trial court in 1998 seeking relief for
the painfully slow responses to the Sheff decision on the part of the
legislative and executive branches of government. 9 4 The case was
placed on the "Complex Litigation Docket" and assigned to Judge
Aurigemma, 95 who found the state's swift enactment of the new statutes, as well as the 1997 state takeover of the Hartford Board of Education, more persuasive than the plaintiffs' arguments that "the state
ha[d] not done enough fast enough." 96
The plaintiffs chose not to appeal, recognizing that the state's
foot-dragging would become more apparent with the passage of

93
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-226h (2002). The statute's reference in subsection (d) to
section 10-266aa relates to the Open Choice program, a voluntary interdistrict transfer
program that theoretically allows students to transfer between city and suburban districts.
See id. § 10-266aa.
94 See Sheff v. O'Neill, 733 A.2d 925, 938 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999); see also Colin Poitras, State to Defend Sheff Action: Plaintiffs Say Response Has Been Insufficient, HARTFORD COURAr, Aug. 31, 1998, at B1.

95 Under Connecticut law, when a case is reversed by the Supreme Court, a new trial
judge must be assigned to the case on remand. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-183c (2002).
96 See Sheff 733 A.2d at 938.
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time. 97 The plaintiffs' "Motion for Order"9 8 was refiled two years later
and returned to the superior court for a second evidentiary hearing in
2002. With more convincing evidence of the state's growing legislative and fiscal inertia-as well as its unwillingness to address the rising
rate of school segregation in a meaningful manner-the stage was set
for settlement discussions. After arduous negotiations, the parties
reached an agreement and entered into a Stipulation and Order
("Stipulation") which recognizes the parties' mutual interest in reducing student "isolation" by creating "a timetable for planned, reasonable progress in reducing student isolation in the Hartford Public
Schools."

99

The Stipulation recited the terms of a detailed settlement in the
form of a four-year agreement. Fully implemented, the plan would
provide at least thirty percent of minority students in the Hartford
public schools access to a desegregated learning environment in magnet schools or in adjacent suburbs.10 0 The plan called for the construction and operation of two new host magnet schools of
approximately 600 students each-approximately 1200 students per
year-during each year of the four-year period of the Stipulation. 0 1
While there has been serious lag and inertia in moving forward
with the state's Open Choice program, progress with the planning,
opening, and operation of host magnet schools has been encouraging. Philip Tegeler, the outgoing Legal Director of the Connecticut
Civil Liberties Union and counsel for the plaintiffs in Sheff v. ONeill,
recently opined that:
[T]he case has helped to create a network of successful magnet
schools in the Hartford region that are exemplary, and show the
possibilities of integrated education. You only have to spend a short
time in these schools-the University of Hartford "multiple intelligences school," the Breakthrough magnet school, the magnet
schools of the Learning Corridor, and others-to understand why
they are chronically oversubscribed, with long city and suburban
wait lists. These schools are models of how integration can work,
97
This conclusion derives from various reports given to the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Board by its Legal Director and lead counsel in Sheff Philip Tegeler, as well as
private conversations between Tegeler and the author.
98 Motion for Order Regarding the Implementation of the Project Choice Program
and the Interdistrict Magnet School Program in the Hartford Region, Sheff v. O'Neill, 733
A.2d 925 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (No. X03 CV89-04921195).
99 Stipulation and Order at 1, Sheffv. O'Neill, 733 A.2d 925 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999)
(No. X03 CV89-04921195) [hereinafter Stipulation].
100 See ik at 3 (The Stipulation focuses on "three instruments used for the reduction of
racial, ethnic and economic isolation... (1) interdistrict magnet school[s], (2) the Open
Choice Program and (3) interdistrict cooperative programs.").
101 See id at 4. While one or more of these schools may be operated as a regional
school at the state's "sole discretion," failure on its part to open at least two such schools
per year "may be deemed to be a material breach" of the Stipulation. See id.
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and with adequate funding and administration, there is no reason

that is
that these models cannot be built on and expanded-indeed
02
the approach taken in our interim settlement agreement.
According to another of the plaintiffs' counsel in Sheff however, the
progress has not been "deliberate" enough. After more than fourteen
years of litigating the school segregation issue, ProfessorJohn Brittain
has rethought his position on the integration effort symbolized by the
Sheffsaga. In an interview in Connecticut's leading newspaper, Professor Brittain spoke bluntly about abandoning integration altogether:
"The resources, time, money and effort such as we put into Sheff vs.
O'Neill, we should really invest in trying to improve educational
achievement even in all one-race, non-white schools .... We've al-

most come back to Plessy vs. Ferguson. Separate, and trying to make it
1 05
equal."
The plaintiffs and their counsel recognize the fact that an entire
generation of Hartford schoolchildren has been deprived of quality
education due to Connecticut's lack of leadership and political will in
10 4
carrying out the steps necessary to integrate the school system.
Eight years after the Sheff decision, and one year after the March 2003
settlement and court order, the state remains noncomplaint with the
Stipulation. t0 5 This noncompliance is especially egregious in light of
Sheffs "each passing day," and the many minority children left behind,10 6 but the aggravating fact that the integrationist programs are
"chronically oversubscribed" adds further insult to injury.
E. One Step Back
On August 3, 2004, the Sheff plaintiffs filed a Motion for Order
Declaring Defendants in Material Breach of theJanuary 22, 2003 Stipulation and Order. 10 7 Their allegations included the following:
1. The defendants did not fulfill the requirement of opening two
new magnet schools in September 2003;
2. One of the magnet schools opened by the defendants was
segregated;
102

Letter from Philip Tegeler, former Legal Director of the Connecticut Civil Liber-

ties Union and counsel for plaintiffs in Sheff to the author (Feb. 22, 2004) (on file with the
author).
Stan Simpson, An Advocate of Integration Reconsiders, HARTFORD COuRAN-r, Feb. 18,
103
2004, at Al (italics added).
104 See id.
Specifically, the state has failed to increase the number of magnet schools in a
105

timely manner, and the slow pace in expanding the "Choice" program in Hartford suburbs
has been a source of deep disappointment and foreboding. See Stipulation, supranote 99.
106 Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1290 (Conn. 1996).
107 Motion for Order Declaring Defendants in Material Breach of theJanuary 22, 2003
Stipulation and Order, Sheff v. O'Neill, 733 A.2d 925 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (No. X03
CV 89-04921 19S).
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3. The defendants did not open two additional magnet schools for
academic year 2004-2005;
4. As of September 2004, the defendants had enrolled fewer than
900 students at the new magnet schools, as opposed to the 2,400
students required by the Order; and
5. The Hartford public schools remain 95% minority.108
The plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Leonard E. Stevens, worked on desegregation cases in Cleveland and Milwaukee and was an expert in the
field of public education. After reviewing the provisions of the Stipulation, Dr. Stevens submitted a report to the plaintiffs that noted that
the two "Host Magnet Schools" opened by the state did not meet the
required enrollment figures and that neither school was desegregated.10 9 Furthermore, many grades were not opened at all. 110 The
two schools failed to enroll the 1,200 students required under the
Stipulation, and of the three magnet schools scheduled to open for
the 2004-2005 academic year, not one was scheduled to reach the
target enrollment of approximately 600 students.1"'
The defendants' desegregation strategy-if it can be called a
"strategy" at all-violates the terms of the Stipulation. The current
school enrollment data are inconsistent with the desegregation goals
established by the Stipulation. As of the time of Dr. Stevens's report,
three of these magnet schools failed to meet the desegregation stan1
dard of the Stipulation. 12
Instead, the State of Connecticut has created a desegregation
anomaly. Despite the ostensible goal of desegregating the Hartford
area schools, current policy is, in fact, drawing minority students in
substantial numbers away from school districts in the suburbs where
their presence contributes to racial diversity.' 13 Dr. Stevens notes that
"this is a segregative pattern of student assignment since they are leaving districts with lesser concentrations of Minority students than the
14
magnet school they are attending."'
On the basis of these failures and anomalies, Dr. Stevens concluded that "the shortfall between actual and potential desegregation
to date is attributable to the absence of rigorous centralized management of the implementation process." '" 5 The open choice program,
1 08
109

See id.
Leonard B. Stevens, Progress Toward a Desegregated Education in Metropolitan

Hartford: A Report to the Plaintiffs 4-5 (Mar. 2004) [hereinafter Stevens Report] (appendix to Motion for Order Declaring Defendants in Material Breach of the January 22, 2003
Stipulation and Order, supra note 107).
110
Id. at 5.
ill
Id.

112

Id. at 7-8 and Attachment C.

113
114
115

Id. at 9.
Id.
Idat 14.
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as well as the regional magnets and host magnets, are essentially compartmentalized operations, and the overall process is lacking a
"quarterback," or overall commander-in-chief. The State of Connecticut is not playing the role of manager and coordinator as called for by
the Stipulation. 116 Whereas the Stipulation provides that the State of
Connecticut "shall be the convener and lead agency" in the Agreement's implementation process,' 17 the state has utterly failed to play
an active and responsible role in this area opting instead for a passive
and mere-spectator role in the process.
The Stipulation required the state to set up a task force to evaluate, inter alia, alternative funding methods for interdistrict magnet
schools and to report on its findings byJanuary 15, 2003.118 Instead,
the state disbanded the task force after two or three meetings and
failed to produce any report. 119 More disturbing is the fact that the
State of Connecticut has proposed reducing the funding of magnet
schools statewide-including the regional magnets' 2 0-by approximately $11 million.
Counsel for both sides held an in-chambers meeting with the new
supervisory judge for the Sheff case, Honorable Susan A. Peck, on September 20, 2004. As of this writing, the state disputes the plaintiffs'
contentions of material breach of the Stipulation. Simultaneous
briefs were to be filed by October 29, 2004, and the plaintiffs' motion
was assigned for oral argument on November 8, 2004.
F.

Conclusion and Afterthoughts

Brown v. Board of Education and Sheff v. O'Neill both exemplify the
integrationist ideal. Shortly after the federal courts struck down de
jure segregation in public facilities and schools as unconstitutional,
the practical effect of Brown devolved from weapon to philosophical
theory. But its legacy as a principle and an ideal remains
undiminished.
Connecticut has crafted a somewhat untrue legal paradigm of its
own in connection with integration. To date, Connecticut remains
the only state in the nation whose highest court has declared de facto
school segregation unconstitutional. Preservation of this monumental
achievement will require ongoing cooperation between the Sheff parties over the next four years-and perhaps for years thereafter. The
terms of the Stipulation agreed to in January 2003 specified as its goal
the reduction of student isolation in the Hartford Public Schools:
116
117

See Stipulation, supra note 99.
Id. at 3.

118

See id. at 6.

119

Stevens Report, supra note 109, at 16.
Id. at 16.

120
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"The State acknowledges its leadership role in accomplishing this
goal. Working with the Hartford Public Schools, suburban school
boards, regional groups and others, the State shall be the convener
and lead agency in the planning, design, implementation and evaluation of annual progress toward achieving the goal of the Stipulation.' 21 Nevertheless, the percentage of minority student enrollment
in the Hartford public schools has risen every year, from 90.4 percent
in 1986122 to 95.52 percent in 1993.123
Connecticut is far from unique. To the contrary, public schools
throughout America have become increasingly segregated. 124 Connecticut has not escaped this national trend. The Connecticut Supreme Court in Sheff recognized the growing "racial divide" in the
state and realized that such disparities necessarily jeopardize minori25
ties' fundamental right to education.
In a state such as Connecticut, where the right to an education is
recognized as a fundamental constitutional right, Brown retains its full
impact as a governing principle: Schools that are separate are unequal,
and education is essential to a decent life and equality of opportunity.
As Chief Justice Warren declared:
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opporit, is a right which
tunity, where the state has undertaken to provide
12 6
must be made available to all on equal terms.
In the Sheff opinion Chief Justice Peters warned: "Every passing
day denies these children their constitutional right to a substantially
equal educational opportunity. Every passing day shortchanges these
children in their ability to learn to contribute to their own well-being
and to that of this state and nation. ' 127 Having won the battle in Sheff
it is incumbent upon those inspired by the legacy of Brown v. Board of
Education not to lose the war for equality of educational opportunity.

121 Stipulation, supra note 99, at 3. Plaintiffs' counsel in the Sheff case, perhaps the
leading state constitutional lawyer in Connecticut, commented: "Whether our plan will
work in the long term remains to be seen but the plaintiffs intend to keep the state's feet to
the fire." Letter from Wesley W. Horton, to the author (Feb. 23, 2004) (on file with
author).
122
COMMITEE ON RACIAL EQurTY REPORT, supra note 20, at 1.
123
Id.
124
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Sheffv. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1290 (Conn. 1996).
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Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1290.
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